×
Browse

Modernity Is Seeking a Hypergood. It’s Making Us Miserable.

In his book Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor argues that moral frameworks are diverse and inescapable. There’s no neutral human being who can survey everyone else’s moral frameworks, with all their biases, from a position of distance and objectivity, as though untouched by a moral framework of his own. We all have them.

From the beginning of life, we intuit particular moral frameworks. Through them, we construct our identities as narratives that are themselves moral spaces. Alongside this, as modern Western people, we treat the sense of self as a moral source in its own right. Whereas some cultures imagine esteem and validation to come from other people on the basis of our deeds (“You are a good person because you did . . .”), Western culture gives us a mantra of unconditional self-affirmation (“I am a good person because I say so”) even when the content our lives suggests otherwise.

Advertise on TGC

How should Christians in the West think about that local moral framework?

In an important sense, it shows us we aren’t the only ones who think about our lives in terms of justification and sanctification. Rather, our secular neighbors live within secularized versions of those categories. Their sense of self makes a qualitative judgment that while life contains many goods, one good must rank highest. Alignment with that highest good is a powerful thing. It confers a justifying power on me, grounding my identity in something good.

Having identified myself with that good, though, a hard and personal question necessarily follows: How does my actual life shape up with that highest good? In a secularized sense, Western culture teaches us to assess our “sanctification” in view of our “justification.”

This framework makes sense of Taylor’s claim that all modern people are invested in counterparts to these deeply Christian notions. Beyond this, it also raises a prior question: How do modern Westernized people arrive at a highest good in the first place? Without a highest good, you have no standard by which to lay hold of justification or to measure your sanctification.

Taylor’s work offers several lenses for answering that question, much like the lenses an optometrist combines in a refraction machine to produce a sharp image. Let’s focus on one of them: Taylor’s idea of the hypergood.

The modern self arrives at its highest good by taking a finite, ordinary good and asking it to play the role of an ultimate one. Read alongside Augustine’s distinction between use and enjoyment, Taylor’s concept reveals this move as a form of idolatry. It overburdens the goods we elevate, damages the goods we neglect, and sets us in conflict with others and with ourselves.

Only when the ultimate place belongs to God can ordinary goods be freed to be what they are.

Why the ‘Good Life’ Is Hard to Define

In chapter 3 of Sources of the Self, “Ethics of Inarticulacy,” Taylor argues that modern Western people find the concept of the “good life” difficult to grasp, for several reasons.

Our identities have many layers that feed into and out of one another in ways that are hard to put into words. We recognize some of those layers as universal, such as abstract political or ideological commitments that also form the others people’s identities. We recognize other layers as highly particular to ourselves.

I might share the same political label as you do, but you didn’t grow up in my town, in my family, or in my skin, and your experiences aren’t my experiences. Holding those two things together is an exceptionally burdensome task.

The modern self arrives at its highest good by taking a finite, ordinary good and asking it to play the role of an ultimate one.

Our present-day identities are also shaped by long and complex historical developments we struggle to narrate, or about which we are simply oblivious. Imagine being asked “What does it mean for you to be a British Christian?” and beginning your answer with “Well, around the year AD 600, Aethelberht, pagan king of Kent, converted to Christianity . . .” A year of solid talking later, you finally arrive at your life in 2026. Or imagine not even beginning with Aethelberht but with the words “Let us begin with the Homeric man.” That isn’t what we tend to do.

Taylor identifies another factor in the ethics of inarticulacy, one he develops more fully in A Secular Age: the difference between living in a transcendent frame and living in an immanent frame. Sources of the Self represents a preparatory stage for that distinction, but the distinction is already emerging there.

Consider a pre-Enlightenment, pre-Cartesian, premodern person, such as a medieval European. He experiences his sense of self in such a way that he believes his mind conforms to things, rather than things conforming to his mind. His moral framework intuits that all things are imbued with inherent meaning and sacred order and that the cosmos as a whole exists in relation to an order that exceeds it.

This is life within a transcendent frame. It orients life around a proper distinction between many things that are relative and the one thing that is ontologically ultimate. The ultimate is categorically different from ordinary, nonultimate things. In Christian terms, this expresses the distinction between the Creator and the creature: One is ultimate, and the other is relative.

In A Secular Age, Taylor traces the shift from medieval to modern as a shift from life in a transcendent frame to life in an immanent frame. In an immanent frame, things conform to my mind, and my sense of self is fundamentally buffered from my body, from my physical environment, and from any claims of metaphysical reality.

The way I distinguish ultimate things from ordinary things is transformed as well, because the ultimate is no longer transcendent. It’s immanent. The ultimate as a categorically other, transcendent reality is gone. What happens instead is that I take something from the immanent realm, from the things near to me, and make it act as my ultimate thing.

Taylor sees this as inescapable for the modern self: We all have something that takes ultimate place. He uses the language of “the thing you’d be at sea without.” If this thing weren’t holding my identity together, I couldn’t be me. I would be lost.

The central question, then, is how does the modern secularized self, which Taylor elsewhere calls the buffered self in an immanent frame, arrive at a highest good? Taylor gives us a particularly useful lens.

Taylor and the Hypergood

Taylor introduces the idea of the hypergood in chapter 3 of Sources of the Self and continues to develop it in chapter 4, “Moral Sources.”

Two caveats are in order. First, the hypergood appears only in Sources of the Self. Taylor doesn’t reprise it in subsequent works. Second, scholars of Taylor’s works have read the concept in different ways. Charles Blattberg, for instance, argues that hypergood is an underdeveloped concept within the book. My own reading is far closer to that of the Dutch philosopher Jasper van Buuren.

The idea works like this: Everyone lives within a moral framework, however much we struggle to articulate it, and nobody lives within a moral framework free of value judgments. No one is an absolute relativist who finds every good to be equally important, because life isn’t livable that way.

Life requires us to find some things more important than others. Without that, we would be completely overwhelmed and paralyzed by the multiplicity of the world. Our sense of agency would end, and we would become entirely passive, acted on but unable to act. In practice, modern people don’t generally live like this.

Taylor describes how modern people often hold a hierarchy of increasingly important goods. For some, the high-ranking goods will be the ideal of rational self-mastery, family life, self-expression, or fame. He writes,

Most of us not only live with many goods but find that we have to rank them, and in some cases, this ranking makes one of them of supreme importance relative to the others. Each of the goods I am talking about here is defined in a qualitative contrast, but some people live according to a higher-order contrast between such goods as well. They recognise the value of self-expression, of justice, of family life, of the worship of God, of ordinary decency, of sensitivity, and a host of others; but they consider one of these—perhaps their relation to God, or perhaps justice—as of overriding importance. This is not to say that they give it unflinching priority in their deliberations and decisions. There may be all sorts of considerations, ranging from a sense of their own limits to the recognition that the other goods are valuable also, which restrain them from this. They may find themselves accused of half-heartedness by other more single-minded adherents to the same good: Why do they not spend more time in prayer? Or why do they not dedicate their whole lives to the struggle for justice in society? But nevertheless as far as they themselves are concerned, this good has an incomparable place in their lives. (63)

The overriding good in Taylor’s examples might be a person’s relation to God, or it might be justice. Whatever it is, it holds a place that no other good can rival.

Problem of Finite Hypergoods

The modern secularized self, then, depends on taking one immanent, finite good and placing it in a position of unparalleled importance, as an organizing principle around which everything else is arranged. The modern self takes a finite thing and asks it to play the role that premodern people gave to an infinite thing.

No one is an absolute relativist who finds every good to be equally important, because life isn’t livable that way. Life requires us to find some things more important than others.

This is where Taylor’s description proves useful. Although the finite thing is asked to act like an infinite thing, or a good thing asked to act like an ultimate thing, it never becomes infinite or ultimate in any ontological sense. It cannot be a universal, ontological ultimate in the way premodern people intuited. It remains one finite good among many, regardless of its new function.

Taylor notes that some modern people are more single-minded than others. Some are utterly in thrall to one ideal, while others serve a group of higher goods. These higher goods are what Taylor calls “hypergoods,” and the term aptly describes this situation.

An ideal of rational self-mastery could be a hypergood. So could a person’s nationality, social class, or achievements. It’s a shame that the term dropped out of Taylor’s work after Sources of the Self, because it helpfully describes an ordinary thing substituted into the role of an extraordinary thing: a finite thing pushed into the role of an infinite thing, a good thing placed under the expectations of an ultimate thing. That ordinary, finite, good thing doesn’t actually become infinite or ultimate.

If I say, “My career is my ultimate thing,” the statement isn’t literally, metaphysically true. My career is an ordinary thing to which I grant a particular set of privileges and responsibilities. At one level, its status is arbitrary.

“Hypergoods,” Taylor writes, “are generally a source of conflict.” This happens in different ways. A hypergood that comes to be widely enjoyed by a culture often gains that position only through a struggle to overthrow older hypergoods. And between people who elevate different, clashing goods to their personal hypergoods, conflict is inevitable. In the background here stands Max Weber, who argues that the move from an enchanted to a disenchanted world turned us all into unhappy polytheists, serving different gods in ways that put us into conflict with one another.

To visualize this, imagine visiting an art gallery and hoping to enjoy a particular painting, a work of art regarded by many as unique and a cultural good to humanity. For the people around you, viewing it is almost a spiritual experience, and they’re elated to see it.

As you enjoy the painting, the silence is broken. Someone shouts “Just stop oil!” and before you know it, the painting is covered in soup, ruined forever. To the protesters, the climate is the ultimate hypergood. Everything else must be ordered in conformity to it, even if that means sacrificing goods that other people rank far higher.

Two Ways of Living with Hypergoods

For Taylor, this represents one approach to hypergoods: The tension between the hypergood and all other goods is resolved by declaring, in effect, that the hypergood is the only good. The painting doesn’t matter, and neither does someone else’s enjoyment of it. (In this sense, terrorism is an exclusivist approach to hypergoods.)

A second approach appears in David Zahl’s book Seculosity, with its picture of modern secularized life as a search for “enoughness.” This is also Aristotle’s solution to the problem of competing goods: Refuse to elevate any one good so far above the others. You need some goods that lead your life, but don’t invest everything in only one of them. Instead, you gently elevate a few goods as lower-stakes hypergoods and spend your life seeking harmony in how you serve each of them. Zahl’s depiction of enoughness, in which I must have done enough in my job, in how I eat, in political engagement, and so on, reflects this approach to serving multiple hypergoods.

These two approaches might be thought of as secularized versions of monotheism and polytheism.

We might think of these two approaches as secularized versions of monotheism and polytheism: on the one hand, service of a single distant, thunderous god; on the other, a life spent juggling service to multiple household and civic deities. Either way, the concept of hypergoods is a valuable tool for understanding how the modern Western self tries to work out what to order itself toward.

It illuminates both the person whose single hypergood is the only good (throwing soup over what she has come to see as a worthless work of art) and the anxious striver who serves a few different hypergoods and wonders whether he’s really doing well enough at any of them.

Inarticulacy and Self-Mutilation

Taylor’s account also invites reflection on the conflict that hypergoods generate within us. Here his idea of the inarticulacy of ethics returns.

We live within moral frameworks far more complex than we generally perceive or know how to describe, and the same is true of the moral space that forms our identities. Because of that inarticulacy, we’re generally poor at perceiving how an elevated hypergood affects the other goods in our lives. If we make an idol out of one thing in life, what are the consequences for everything else in the same life?

For Taylor, the hypergood involves a kind of self-deception. We tell ourselves that out of all the ordinary things that form our identities, this one thing (or these few things) is what truly sustains us. Given our inarticulacy, we overlook and neglect many other goods that don’t receive the hypergood treatment. In service of justice, I destroy beauty. In service of career, I neglect my relationships. And so a life grows contorted. Taylor describes the result in the language of “self-mutilation,” a consequence of whatever goods we elevate as hypergoods.

The only modest remedy, he suggests, is greater articulacy. We must learn to talk about our identity, our quest, our moral framework, and our life’s narrative as moral space. Then, at least, we’re at least more on guard against the ways our hypergoods harm the nonprivileged parts of our lives.

We may also become aware there are some goods we truly cannot sacrifice to serve our hypergoods, and that other people have elevated different hypergoods. This awareness might reduce our conflict with others, but it’ll increase our conflict within ourselves. It’s an uphill struggle, according to Taylor.

Use and Enjoyment

An important theological insight about idolatry from Augustine helps bring these threads together. He makes a distinction between what he calls the use and enjoyment of a thing. By this, he means we should never seek the ultimate meaning of a created thing in the thing itself. Instead, we must use things to enjoy something beyond them. We must see created things as gifts behind which is something infinitely greater: the Giver.

Augustine’s idea is that if we confuse use and enjoyment, mistaking the gift for the Giver, we become idolaters. Beyond that, we overburden the gift, expecting it to give us something it couldn’t possibly give and to be something it couldn’t possibly be.

We ask a finite thing to be an infinite thing, a good thing to be the ultimate thing. We expect creaturely things to be to us what only God himself can be. And when we do that, Augustine sees, we actually crush the thing. We overburden it, and our lives become contorted and full of conflict. Conversely, when we don’t overburden ordinary things by asking them to act like ultimate things, they can simply be what they are: good things.

The only true object of enjoyment is God himself.

In concrete terms, you’ll be a better friend if the approval of your friendship group isn’t your hypergood. You’ll be a better parent if your child isn’t your hypergood. You’ll be a better student if achievement isn’t your hypergood. You’ll be a better citizen if your nation isn’t your hypergood.

This list could go on to describe the total picture of a human life. The big idea behind that picture—one that’s hard for the modern person to grasp—is Augustine’s insight that “to enjoy something is to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake.” In that sense, the only true object of enjoyment is God himself.

God isn’t a means to an end. To enjoy him is to accept that in him, you have everything that could possibly satisfy. He offers you ultimate enoughness. And having been satisfied there, life changes. Created, nonultimate things are liberated to be what they actually are, rather than pushed to act as something they never can be.

Join The Keller Center mailing list

The Keller Center for Cultural Apologetics helps Christians share the truth, goodness, and beauty of the gospel as the only hope that fulfills our deepest longings. We want to train Christians—everyone from pastors to parents to professors—to boldly share the good news of Jesus Christ in a way that clearly communicates to this secular age.

Click the button below to sign up for updates and announcements from The Keller Center.

Join the mailing list »